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Introduction
PPPs has led to higher de cits and to projects being provided as PPPs when public provision was more e cient. 7 Sometimes governments choose PPPs for ideological reasons: PPPs are a second best option to replace an incompetent public sector with an e cient private sector when privatization is not possible. This argument is incorrect since rst, it omits that the private sector is involved in public provision of infrastructure: as designers, builders and often as operators and maintainers of public infrastructure. Second, because providing e cient infrastructure services under a PPP requires stronger government capabilities than under public provision. The nancial aspects of PPPs are more complex and there is more scope for opportunistic behavior, because the contractual relationship between the rm and the government is long-lasting under a PPP. These issues are at the core of the governance challenges for PPPs that we discuss below.
Why governments should choose PPPs: Economic reasons
An economic argument for PPPs is that governments should choose PPPs over public provision when they provide su cient e ciency gains. Since private rms are involved in building infrastructure projects both under public provision and PPPs, e ciency gains do not arise from private participation per se, but from the di erent incentives under both organizational forms. These may be due to di erences in risk allocation, contract design, nancing, and political economy.
Seven e ciency claims are advanced to prefer PPPs over public provision: narrow focus and dedicated management, the advantages of bundling, fewer delays in construction, ltering white elephants, avoiding the cost of bureaucracies, the disciplining e ects of private nancing and better (and often cheaper) maintenance. We review these arguments next.
Narrow focus and dedicated management: A PPP is a private entity whose contracting relations with employees, other rms and nanciers are governed by private law. This improves incentives, because during the term of the PPP, the private rm can manage the infrastructure as a private entity, bound by the contract with the Public Authority. Moreover, by creating a rm (called Special Purpose Vehicle or SPV) to build and manage the infrastructure project, the scope of the rm is clearly de ned and bounded, and the project gets a dedicated management team, which answers to the rm's board.
Bundling: PPPs provide incentives to make non-contractible investments during construction that may reduce maintenance and operations costs over the lifecycle of the concession (Grout, 2003; Hart, 2003) . No such incentives are present under public provision since di erent rms are in charge of construction and operations. This 'bundling argument' in favor of PPPs requires that quality of service be contractible, for otherwise the concessionaire may lower costs by degrading the quality of service. Singh (2018) provides evidence that PPPs encourage the life-cycle approach toward maintenance.
Fewer construction delays: Incentives to avoid delays are large if a PPP can only begin charging user fees, or receiving government transfers, once the project is operational.
The two e ciency arguments in favor of PPPs that follow apply when the project is funded mainly with user fees.
Filtering white elephants: In the absence of government transfers, PPPs will lter white elephants, since no rm will be interested in a project where user fees cannot pay for capital and operational expenditures.
This insight goes back to Adam Smith. 8 Avoiding the cost of bureaucracies: PPPs allow users to pay the rm building and operating the infrastructure asset directly, avoiding the e ciency costs associated with spending money via government bureaucracies (see Engel et al., 2013 , for a formal model). These e ciency costs are caused by two related factors: the justi able rigidities in public spending, and to the costs of corruption those rigidities are meant to reduce.
Advantages of private nancing: PPPs developed hand-in-hand with project nance, a technique based on lending against the cash ow of a project that is legally and economically self-contained. Banks are usually the main nanciers during construction, helping to mitigate moral hazard by exercising tight control over changes in the project's design and disbursing funds only gradually as project stages are completed.
The oversight under public provision is weaker due to increased moral hazard because of looser incentives.
Better and less expensive maintenance: In many countries there is a bias in spending in favor of new infrastructure and against the maintenance of existing infrastructure, because new infrastructure is more visible and can be used to increase an incumbent's reelection probability. 9 Also, the annual logic of public budgets makes it di cult to set aside resources for future maintenance at the time the project is built.
The cost of poor maintenance under public provision can be very high. Not only is average quality of service much lower than if maintenance were continuous but the overall cost of maintenance is much higher. For example, in the case of highways, the cost of intermittent maintenance, that often involves costly rehabilitations, has been estimated to be between 1.5 and 3 times the cost of continuous maintenance, which is the most e cient approach. 10 Recent studies (see Leslie, 2018 , and references therein) suggest that PPPs may involve important e ciency gains from better maintenance for other types of infrastructure services, prominent among them hospitals.
PPPs solve the maintenance problem of public provision if the quality of the services provided by the infrastructure asset is contractible. It then su ces to include service quality speci cations in the contract and to enforce them on a regular basis during the lifetime of the contract. In the case of highways, which account for the largest fraction of investment in PPPs, the e ciency gains associated with better and cheaper maintenance are likely to be large. On the cost side, these savings are somewhere between 10 and 16 percent of initial investments. 11 8 "When high roads are made and supported by the commerce that is carried on by means of them, they can be made only where that commerce requires them. [. . . ] A magni cent road cannot be made merely because it happens to lead to the country villa of the intendant of the province [. . . ]" Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776. 9 Rioja (2003) estimates, based on social welfare criteria, that one third of expenditures on new infrastructure should be allocated to maintaining existing projects. 10 See TRiP (2013) for the lower bound, which applies to the US, and Engel et al. (2014) for the upper bound, which is obtained for developing countries. The di erence grows with the extent to which the road is allowed to deteriorate before it is rehabilitated. 11 We arrive at this range as follows: Annual maintenance costs of a typical highway are typically between 2 and 3 percent of
Governance and renegotiations
Providing infrastructure services under a PPP requires higher government capabilities than under public provision. Financing is more complex and there is more scope for opportunistic behavior, because the contractual relationship between the rm and the government lasts much longer under a PPP. For this reason, su cient state capabilities are needed for a successful PPP program.
Many PPP projects have been bailed out by governments, which can turn the public against PPPs.
For example, public support for the Public Finance Initiative (or PFI) of the UK, never recovered after the bailout of the London Underground PPP in 2008, which cost taxpayers somewhere between £170 million and £410 million (NAO, 2018) . This may explain, in part, why PPP investments in the last decade are a small fraction of what they were at their peak in the early 2000s.
Bailouts are one extreme form of renegotiation, where government fully takes downside risk. More generally, contract renegotiations that modify the initial contract have been pervasive under PPPs. This means that many of the avowed e ciency advantages of PPPs are not realized. Even though incompleteness is to be expected in a complex contract that lasts several decades, the evidence suggests that renegotiations are often due to poor project and contract design, opportunistic behavior by concessionaires, the desire of incumbents to increase spending in infrastructure, and outright corruption.
When concessionaires expect to be bailed out if there is low demand for the project, PPPs do not lter white elephants. Similarly, incentives for careful project and contract design are weak when lack of diligence at the design stage can be corrected by altering the project during construction. Even more worrisome, when contract renegotiations become central to the PPP business model, rms that are good at renegotiating and lobbying have an advantage, as they can bid more aggressively when the project is tendered, in the expectation of recovering pro tability when renegotiations take place.
In contrast to public provision, PPPs involve a long term relation between the concessionaire and government. A bene t for the current government is that it can ask for additional works to the initial project, and pay for it with an extension of the concession term or with payment obligations on future administrations. The additional spending does not go through the usual budgetary oversight process. The e ect is to reduce the resources available to future governments. Moreover, the new works are likely to become more expensive because they are usually not tendered under competition.
Recent evidence from Latin America shows a connection between renegotiations and corruption. Campos et al. (2019) consider all projects undertaken by the Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht in eight countries over a ten year period, and nd that the average renegotiation, as a fraction of the initial investment, was 71 percent for projects where bribes were paid, compared with 6 percent for projects with no bribes.
These percentages do not di er substantially between PPPs and public provision, suggesting that renegotiations are always problematic when providing public infrastructure.
Costly renegotiations can be reduced by making them less attractive for concessionaires and public authorities. For example, the contract can include the requirement that any signi cant addition to the project should be assigned in a competitive auction, where the owners of the SPV cannot participate. Anthe initial investment. Over a thirty year period, discounted at 5 percent, this adds up to between 32 and 48 percent. Using the 3:1 ratio of maintenance costs under continuous and intermittent maintenance then leads to the 10 to 16 percent range for savings.
other helpful measure in reducing the incentives to renegotiate is the creation of independent, specialized entities that review and approve renegotiations to ensure that the SPV and its owners do not bene t from the increased value of the project.
Costly renegotiations can also be avoided by using contracts with better risk allocation. In the standard xed term highway PPP contract with tolls, the concessionaire bears all the exogenous demand risk.
This risk is in general beyond her control, and low realizations of demand often trigger renegotiations. In contrast, a exible term contract, where the winning rm collects a xed amount in user fees (in present value), eliminates demand risk borne by the concessionaire. These Present-Value-of-Revenue (PVR) contracts have a built-in renegotiation, by extending the contract term when the demand realization is low, without the need to modify the contract, thereby avoiding that source of opportunistic behavior.
Chile began using PVR contracts for most transportation PPPs in 2007 and reformed its PPP legislation in 2010. The reform created the independent technical panel that reviews and authorizes renegotiations, and requires the owners of the SPV to auction the works required by all major additions to the initial project. The combination of both policy innovations was followed by a reduction in renegotiations, as a fraction of investment, of more than 90 percent.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we brie y review some data about global and regional PPP spending, and show that PPPs are a modest share of total infrastructure spending.
Section 3 explains how current scal accounting practices stimulate the use of PPPs for the wrong reasons.
Section 4 discusses the e ciency gains potentially brought about by PPPs. Section 5 deals with renegotiations, perhaps the main threat to the PPP model of procurement. Section 6 describes the PVR contract, which corrects many of the defects of xed-term contracts. Section 7 concludes.
2 PPPs around the world
World infrastructure and PPPs
Governments use PPPs to procure infrastructure. 12 Comprehensive gures of world infrastructure spending are notoriously di cult to obtain. Available estimates of global infrastructure and PPP spending come from a few studies by global consultancy rms and must be parsed from several studies. We now will see that available data suggests that PPP spending accounts for about 3 percent of global infrastructure spending, and 8 percent of private infrastructure spending. 13 According to Airoldi et al. (2013, Exhibit 1), world public and private infrastructure spending, excluding telecoms, averaged about USD 2.7 trillion in 2008-2010. 14 As can be seen in column 1 of Table 1, spending can be broken down in transportation (USD 1,040 billion); social infrastructure (USD 490 billion), water and waste (USD 160 billion), oil and gas transmission (USD 190 billion), and electricity (USD 810 billion). 12 There are variations about what classi es as infrastructure. Ports, airports, railroads and roads are almost universally included in any list and called "transport infrastructure". "Social infrastructure" includes government buildings and facilities, schools, jails and hospitals. "Energy" includes electricity (generation, transmission and distribution) and pipelines (oil and gas). "Sanitary infrastructure" includes waste management and water (production, distribution, sewerage and treatment). Finally, sometimes telecom investments (cable or ber optic transmission, towers, base stations, xed line and satellites) are included. 13 What follows is based on Engel et al. (2014b) 14 This estimate includes 69 countries which account for about 96 percentage of world GDP.
Transportation, in turn, can be broken down in ports (USD 110 billion), airports (USD 80 billion), rail (USD 400 billion) and roads (USD 450 billion). Moreover, according to the consultancy Infonetics, global capex spending in telecomm was about USD 300 billion in 2011. Hence, yearly global infrastructure spending is about USD 3 trillion, around 5 percentage of world GDP. It can also be seen in Table 1 that around 75 percent of PPP spending is in the transport sector, that is, between USD 45 and USD 75 billion per year. Another 20 percent of PPP spending nances government services (between USD 12 and USD 20 billion per year), while the remainder (between USD 3 and USD 5 billion per year) is invested in the electricity, telecoms, and water and waste sectors. It follows that PPP spending is only a small fraction of global infrastructure spending: around 3 percent of total world infrastructure spending and around 8 percent of private infrastructure spending.
PPPs in Europe and developing countries
Both PPP spending and the number of projects are relatively small, and for that same reason, both the composition and size of PPP investment varies from year to year. To gain some perspective about recent developments in PPP spending, we present some data from Europe and from developing countries. All in all, since the 1990s 1,841 PPP projects were undertaken in the entire European Union, valued at €383.2B. 15 The average project value of €480MM. As can be seen in gure 2, which decomposes the value of projects by sector, more than half of the investments (54.8 percent) were in roads (391 projects of about €500MM on average), followed at a big distance by healthcare (393 projects of about €129MM on average) and 443 education projects, with an average investment of €81MM.
Europe
However, these investments are a small fraction of EU investments in infrastructure. Notwithstanding their small proportion of total infrastructure expenditure, in some of these countries PPP projects represented substantial additions to the transport infrastructure. For instance in Portugal, between 1999 and 2008, 1,300km of highways were built using PPPs. Since before1999, Portugal only had 2,000km of highways, this represented a 65 percent increase in the highway stock in 9 less than a decade. 16 
Developing countries
The Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) keeps a database of PPP projects in developing countries, classi ed by type of investment (transport, energy, telecom and water and sanitation related). Between 1990 and 2018 there were 1,762 transport projects (Railroads, Roads, Ports and Airports) for a combined investment value of USD 535 billion. The average project size in the case of roads was USD 287MM, close to the project average of USD 304B. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the PPPs in value as well as in number of projects. 17 infrastructure. In the case of airports, with a very high average project value of 670MM, the average is raised by two outliers, the US$35B IGA airport in Turkey and the combined US$20B in the Guarulos (Sao Paulo) and the Rio de Janeiros' airport, both in Brazil. In fact, the median project size is far smaller than the average size in the case of airports. 
Why governments use PPPs: Fiscal accounting
In many, if not most cases, PPPs have been attractive to policy makers because they promise to relax the scal constraints that limit resources for infrastructure projects. The government can build schools, hospitals, roads and airports without their cost representing an increase in scal de cits. A second reason is that often PPPs coincide with political preferences for an increase in the scope of the private sector. 18
PPPs as a means of evading scal spending constraints
As mentioned in the introduction, PPPs investment is not considered to be part of the scal de cit. This is true even when the PPPs involve periodic payments to the private party. Thus governments that are scally constrained may nd it an attractive way of evading these constraints to indulge in politically attractive infrastructure spending. In fact, this seems to have been the main incentive for the use of PPPs in Europe. In the UK, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), led to increases in public investment that were not recorded in the standard measures of public debt. 19 According to the PFI and PF2 National Accounting . 19 As a signatory to the Maastricht Accord, the UK was required to keep its scal de cit below a maximum de cit. VfM is a concept that is easily manipulated, even in a developed country such as the UK. 20 Portugal received €20 billion in PPP investments in roads, hospitals and other projects in the period 1995-2014. Most of the investment was in highways that used shadow tolls (94 percent of PPP investment).
The minimum guaranteed payments represents 1 percent of GDP, annualy, in 2014-2020, falling to 0,5 percent of GDP until 2030. In a study of Portuguese PPPs, Sarmento and Renneboog (2014) . write that "[. . . ] the incentive to resort to PPPs was mainly to avoid budget constraints, but not to use of public resources better by taking advantage of private sector [. . . ]".
Even the case of a PPP that charges user fees, such as a tolled road, does not represent a break from the principle that PPPs have the same e ect as public provision on the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. Note that the Public Authority could have created a public Single Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which could contract a private rm to design and build the same road, charge the same tolls and generate 20 "A robust VfM assessment is important for all public sector investment decisions. Any public body procuring an asset which will be privately nanced has to compare the VfM of private nance against a public sector comparator (PSC). It has an incentive to show that private nance o ers better value for money than the PSC as unless alternative capital funding is made available the project is unlikely to proceed. We previously concluded in our 2013 report Review of the VfM assessment process for PFI that these VfM assessments have features which favour and advantage PFI in comparison to a publicly nanced approach. " National Audit O ce, HM Treasury: "PFI and PF2", 2018, p. 19. as much toll revenue as the private party. This SPV could have issued a bond whose repayment is tied to toll revenues, and it would in principle have access to conditions that are identical to those of the private party. 21 Thus in using the PPP approach to build a project, the Public Authority is not obtaining additional resources from those it could have obtained by itself.
The advantages of PPPs must lie elsewhere, for example, in e ciency gains, as discussed in the introduction and the section that follows. We have shown (Engel et al., 2013) that the e ects of PPPs on the intertemporal balance sheet are no di erent from those of public provision. Table 3 provides the intuition when funding comes from government transfers. The rst column shows the dynamics of debt and spending under public provision, the second column under PPP. In both cases, the infrastructure that is built today comes with a commitment to collect taxes in the future, in the same amount, and therefore the initial investment should count as public debt in both cases. Table 4 considers the case where user fees fund the project. Now, for both organizational forms, building the infrastructure entails a commitment to collect user fees in the future, in the same amount, to pay for the debt. It follows that the upfront investments should be counted as debt for a PPP as well. 
Distorted Policy choices
The choice between PPPs and public provision of infrastructure is distorted because PPPs are at least partially excluded from the balance sheet. This distortion disappears if PPPs are included in toto in the balance sheet at the inception of the contract. As revenues accrue and the time at which the PPP contract ends comes nearer, the balance sheet incorporates these revenues on the revenue side. By doing this, the choice between doing a project as a PPP or as a public project is not distorted by the fact that the costs of the project are charged onto the future. In that case, choice between PPPs and traditional provision of infrastructure would depend only on which approach is demonstrably more e cient in the provision of infrastructure.
Eurostat and scal accounting of PPPs
In order to limit the unrestricted use of PPPs for unrecorded scal expenditure, Eurostat introduced accounting rules for PPPs (Eurostat, 2016 22 For example, question 70 asks "does the (private) partner bear the construction risk and at least one of either the availability or the demand risks?. " If the answer is 'no', the asset is classi ed on the government's balance sheet. If the answer is 'yes', additional conditions must be met for the asset to be kept o the government's balance sheet. 23 With traditional provision, incentives tend to be weak, because public agencies have multiple objectives and principals, scal accounting practices are not the right tools to monitor performance, and earnings do not reward employees and owners. Moreover, laws and the legislature constrain hiring, purchasing amd contracting practices, and the organizational and management structure of the organization is determined by statute. Finally, the scale and scope of the organization that manages projects is set largely by the exogenously given administrative structure of the government, not by any e ciency consideration or regard for the optimal scope of the organization.
The consequences of poor incentives are also well known. The infrastructure assets are poorly maintained, because budgets are subject to yearly appropriations, maintenance expenditures are less visible than new works, and sometimes poor design and construction increases the cost of maintenance. Consequently, the quality of service in general tends to be low. In addition, project selection tends to be poor, both because demand is systematically overstated, and because costs and building times are underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2003) . Worse, pork barrel projects and poor planning often build white elephants.
Subcontracting tasks to private rms has been the main means whereby private incentives were brought into public provision. PPPs represent a di erent organizational form that goes beyond hiring contractors to build a project. Under a PPP, the private concern creates a private entity-a so called special purpose vehicle or SPV-in charge of nancing, delivering and operating a public project. While the relation between the state and the SPV is still governed by public law, the SPV is a private rm and its contracting relations with employees, other rms, and nanciers are governed by private law. This improves incentives, because during the term of the PPP, the SPV has discretion to manage the infrastructure as a private rm. Moreover, by creating an SPV, the scope of the rm is clearly de ned and limited, and the project gets a dedicated management team, which answers to the SPV board.
The literature also notes that a PPP is an intertemporal contract between the government and a private rm which bundles nance, construction, maintenance, and operations. Hart (2003) has shown that the theoretical bene ts brought about by PPPs arise in part from bundling design, building, operation, and maintenance. The reasoning is that since the concessionaire will operate and maintain the project, it will design and build it to minimize life cycle costs. Moreover, provided that the quality of conservation can be measured and required by the contract, it is in the interest of the concessionaire to maintain the infrastructure continuously.
Bundling, however, introduces a basic trade o , identi ed by Hart (2003) : other things equal, it stimulates investments and actions that cut life-cycle costs and other costs more generally. Nevertheless, this cost cutting may occur at the expense of service quality and user welfare; this is commonly known as "Hart's tradeo . " Thus, there is a strong presumption that PPPs will work well only if maintenance, quality and performance standards can be described clearly in the contract and can then be enforced. This is the case of roads, for example.
The theoretical advantages of bundling have proven di cult to test, but the bene ts in terms of maintenance are clear. As we have already mentioned, governments often do not perform regular, continuous maintenance because the e ect of the resources that are used is not salient to the public. There are more politically attractive uses for these resources: completely new infrastructure projects, or the repairs of severely deteriorated infrastructure. In both cases, the bene ts are obvious and contrast with the lack of perceived bene ts from routine maintenance. On the other hand, a PPP owner is very interested in routine maintenance if quality standards are enforced. The rm is aware of the increased costs of reactive maintenance and of the penalties associated to insu cient maintenance and will manage the project so that it is correctly maintained at all times. As mentioned in the introduction, continuous maintenance of a highway not only provides considerably better quality of service but also is much cheaper.
There is some anecdotal evidence that PPP projects tend to be delivered on time, which suggests stronger performance incentives. For example, Raisbeck, Du eld and Xu (2010) found that in a sample of 21 PPP projects and 31 traditional projects in Australia, the time "between the signing of the nal contract and project completion, PPPs were found to be completed 3.4% ahead of time on average, while traditional projects were completed 23.5% behind time. " Indeed, if the rm starts to receive revenues only when the project starts to operate, there is a cost to delays, and an incentive to nish construction as fast as possible. In the particular case of xed term contracts nanced with user fees, this incentive is even stronger, because delays in construction cut into the revenue generating period. On-time delivery also requires better planning, project design, and execution, all of which may lead to reduced cost overruns. 24 Even under PPPs, the government is responsible for planning what to build (network planning and coordination), whether a particular project should be built (cost-bene t appraisal), and when it should be built. In addition, there are arguments for and against delegating project design to the concessionaire. The argument in favor of delegating design is that it takes advantage of the creativity of the private sector and transfers design risk to the concessionaire. But the case can be made that governments who delegate project design tend not to have a full understanding of the projects they procure in the rst place, nor of the risks they confront. The relevant point here is that it is unlikely that delegating project planning to the concessionaire will systematically increase productive or dynamic e ciency. A case can be made for collaboration between the two parties in improving a government designed project after the bidder has been selected in a competitive process. 25 Two additional sources of e ciency gains appear when the PPP is nanced with user fees. First, the transfer of resources to the private rm is direct. In contrast, in a publicly funded project, the resources for construction, maintenance and operations are collected through taxes, and wend their way through the government bureaucracy, until eventually they reach their destination in the private rm that performs those tasks. The direct approach eliminates the costs associated to this bureaucracy. The second bene t is that tolling can be used to deal with congestion and increase allocative e ciency. In a congested highway, the marginal cost should include the congestion externality. Moreover, given that the taxes used to provide a free publicly provided highway create distortions, it might well be that a PPP with user fees is more e cient globally than a free publicly provided road with a larger congestion externality. In fact a globally 24 A rule of thumb in construction says that if the project is delayed, outlays in materials and labor directly employed in construction are postponed as well, but overheads continue to be incurred. A second rule of thumb says that overhead is roughly one-third of the yearly and total cost of a project. Thus if T years is the estimated duration of the project and yearly outlays are equal to 100, then an delay of t years creates an overrun of the order of (100t/3T). Thus, delays create cost overruns. Source: Klaus Grewe, personal communication. 25 An alternative auction process for complex projects is for the government to assign the project to the best project for purpose, given the resources announced for the project. optimal scal policy would set tolls slightly higher than the optimal congestion toll, because by so doing the government can reduce distortionary taxation elsewhere (see Engel et al. 2013 ). 26 
Incentives and risk allocation
Risk allocation is one of the main functions of the PPP contract. Following Irwin (2007) Bundling, control, and service standards are all required to ensure that these risks are e ectively borne by the concessionaire. For example, it may be harder (i.e., more expensive) to make a concessionaire responsible for service quality if it was not responsible for building the facility (hence the importance of bundling) or if the concessionaire has no control over investment and operational decisions (hence the importance of control, or ownership, rights). Similarly, without objective and measurable service standards, it is di cult to transfer service quality risk to the concessionaire.
As Hall (1998) points out, risk allocation depends in part on how the concessionaire is remunerated.
As mentioned above, to create strong incentives to complete the project on time, the rm should receive payments only after the facility starts to operate. Similarly, availability payments which are contingent on meeting service quality standards generate strong incentives for adequate maintenance and performance.
By contrast, when payments do not depend on performance or, worse, the rm can transfer cost overruns to taxpayers, PPPs reproduce the weak incentives of public provision.
Some of the risks are created by government policies. Because the residual value of PPP assets depends on government planning decisions (not to mention that most assets are project speci c), and the willingness to charge tolls in future concessions, it is sensible to transfer the residual value risk to the government. This happens when the concessionaire recovers its initial investment over the term of the contract, and then transfers the residual value to the government. This principle suggests, as well, that an e cient policy would have some policy risks borne by the government, so as to reduce its own moral 26 A nal advantage of PPPs nanced by user tolls is that the private rm may be less responsive to petitions to lower user fees than a publicly elected o cial.
hazard.
Broadly speaking, policy risks fall into two categories. First, the government may implement policies that directly a ect the project and have few other e ects. For example, it may change the rules to expropriate the concessionaire. These principles indicate that these risks should be borne by the government, to prevent opportunism. Second, actions by the government or the legislature may unintentionally a ect the PPP. For example, currency devaluation may reduce a foreign rm's return, or a change in environmental standards may require additional investments. In these cases, the concessionaire is in the same position as any other private rm in the economy. Therefore, these are standard business risks. This principle is routinely overlooked. 27 For example, governments often grant foreign concessionaires insurance against devaluations. Not only does this discriminate against local investors, but it also discriminates against foreign rms in other sectors of the economy that bear this risk. More generally, policy risks that do not target the project speci cally and that a ect most rms in the economy (for example, those caused by monetary policy) should be treated as exogenous and allocated according to general principles of risk diversi cation.
Perhaps the main exogenous risk in a PPP project nanced by user fees is uncertainty about demand.
As mentioned above, the general principle is that exogenous demand risk should be borne by the party best able to bear it. If the private rm assumes demand risk, taxpayers are in fact purchasing an insurance contract on an exogenous risk that they assume under public provision (see Engel et al. 2014a, chapter 5).
As Hall (1998) notes, this is not cost e ective. Demand forecasts are notoriously imprecise and changes in policy, which are unknown at the time of tendering, may radically a ect the usage of the facility, yet there is little that the rm can do about it. Even the design of the project is usually determined by the government. In those cases, either a present-value-of-revenue contract (see section 6) or an availability contract are the appropriate compensation scheme, depending on whether the main source of funds are user fees or government transfers.
The principle of transferring exogenous demand risk to the government admits one important exception. When user fees are a PPP's only source of remuneration, the willingness of private rms to bid for the contract is a market signal that demand is su cient (at least in expectation). This introduces a market test that is usually absent in infrastructure services and that helps to avoid white elephants. If there are no bidders at an auction, this is a signal that the project is not privately pro table and therefore there is a risk that the project is a white elephant unless it has large positive externalities.
As in the case of demand risk, nancial risk is largely outside the rm's control. This does not mean, however, that the government should bear interest rate or exchange rate risk. Other rms in the economy do not receive this favoured treatment, and rms can choose among alternative capital structures. More generally, governments are not particularly e cient at providing and selling nancial insurance.
Governance and renegotiations
Given the often unsatisfactory results of PPP programs in infrastructure, it is worthwhile to study whether this is due to di culties in the governance of PPPs. At a minimum, a PPP-capable country requires a level of institutions that allow private parties to invest large amounts in sunk projects in the expectation that they will receive a return. In particular, it requires that the revenue stream associated to the project can be pledged to third parties and that they are rst in line if the SPV associated to the PPP fails. Furthermore, there has to be a reasonable expectation that the investment cannot be expropriated without compensation.
These conditions may preclude PPP investment in some countries. 28 However, even in countries that satisfy these minimal requirements, there is no guarantee that an infrastructure PPP will be successful. We deal with some of these problems in this section. And at least 60 percent of the renegotiated spending increase falls on future administrations. 29 One might think that renegotiations occur mainly in emerging economies, where governance is weak.
Renegotiations are pervasive
They are also pervasive in developed countries, however, as documented long ago by Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer (1993). For example, three of the four highway concessions awarded in France in the early 1970s went bankrupt after the 1973 oil shock and were bailed out by the government. Similarly, several of the twelve highway concessions awarded in Spain in the 1970s had higher costs than anticipated, while tra c 28 Or if it exists, it must be supported by multilateral nancial institutions, see Engel et al. (2014a) . 29 Renegotiations are not only common in transportation infrastructure. An example from the sanitation sector are the two concessions for water utilities in Manila, Phillippines, in 1997. As noted in Wu and Malaluan (2007) , the state owned utility was divided geographically into two companies serving the city, and put up for auction of 25 year concessions. The two winning consortia o ered tari s that were 26 and 56% of the previous rates. However, by 2002 they had managed to renegotiate their contracts and double the prices (using the Asian crisis as an argument), and then almost doubled them again in 2005. Moreover, the companies invested less than speci ed in their contracts, at least until 2003, when Manila Water began to expand investment rapidly, perhaps because after the change in tari s the implied rate of return on assets rose to 9%. Despite this, due to bad management, the other company, Manilad, went bankrupt (in 2003) after its petition for even larger tari increases were denied. Regardless of the adverse e ects of raising rates, there were compensating bene ts from privatization: a massive expansion in connections by 30% in the rst ve years of operation, and in Manila Water, non revenue water (lost to theft or because of leaking pipes) decreased from almost 58% to 35%, while the response to service complaints and the time to repair leaks improved substantially. We can conclude from this case that unless precautions are taken, the bids of companies can be renegotiated to the advantage of the winners at the expense of the public, but in some cases even then the public can bene t. For a more critical evaluation see Esguerra (2003) . was lower than expected, causing three highways to go bankrupt and the remaining contracts to be renegotiated. Spain seems to be a serial subsidizer of PPPs at the expense of the public: in November 2010, all political parties agreed that it was necessary to bail out, among others, the seven PPP highways running into Madrid (see Engel et al., 2018b) .
Industry participants often claim that circumstances change over the life of a concession. Because most PPP contracts last for several decades, renegotiations of inherently incomplete contracts are to be expected. Renegotiations thus provide the exibility necessary to adapt to changing conditions. While there is some truth to this argument, it ignores two disturbing features of most renegotiations. First, they often occur shortly after contracts are awarded. For example, Guasch (2004, p. 14) nds that the average time to renegotiation was only 2.2 years after the concession was awarded, and 60 percent of all renegotiated contracts had been renegotiated within the rst three years after the concession award. Engel et al. (2009) show that 78 percent of the amounts awarded in renegotiations of PPPs in Chile were brokered during construction, shortly after the concession was awarded. 30 Second, renegotiations tend to favor the concessionaire. For example, Guasch (2004) nds that twothirds led to tari increases, 38 percent to extensions of the concession term, and two-thirds to reductions in investment obligations. In the case of Chilean PPPs, we nd that most renegotiations imply paying more for the works than originally contracted. Thus, while in principle renegotiations may allow governments to expropriate concessionaires after they have sunk their investment, in practice it seems that the private partner bene ts the most, at least in Latin America. 31 
The origin and consequence of renegotiations
The prevalence of renegotiations suggests that they are not accidents, but an equilibrium outcome of the incentive structure in place. There are at least four economic mechanisms that produce systematic renegotiations.
One is related to the political cycle. In Engel et al. (2019c) we show that the possibility of being ousted from o ce increases the e ective discount rate of the incumbent, who values the future less than the social planner and wants to anticipate spending and increase the probability of winning an election. Because scal accounting rules keep PPPs o balance sheet, the incumbent can renegotiate the PPP contract to increase current infrastructure spending. The concessionaire, in turn, is willing to renegotiate the contract because he is backed by a long-term legal agreement that is binding on future administrations. This mechanism works independently of how the PPP is funded. With availability payments (as is the case, for example, with many highways in Europe), renegotiated payments will be borne by future administrations and constrain their ability to spend. If, on the other hand, the infrastructure is funded with tolls, future governments will forego revenues (see Engel et al. 2013 ). Whatever the funding source, the incumbent can tie up resources that would have been available to future administrations, in exchange for current infrastructure spending by the concessionaire. In essence, therefore, in a renegotiation the concessionaire lends to the incumbent in exchange for payments by future administrations. The incumbent's commitment is credible because the concessionaire has a long-term contract with the State, not only with the incumbent administration.
Even though there is no systematic evidence on the frequency of renegotiation of infrastructure provided under the traditional approach, the above argument suggests that renegotiations should be less frequent in this case. Since the relation between government and the rm exists only during the construction period, there is less time for the rm to nd arguments to renegotiate the contract. It is also more di cult to add additional works because it would incur additional expenditures that must be approved by the legislature.
Renegotiations also generate adverse selection, by attracting rms that are better at renegotiating and skilled at lobbying, but technically less pro cient. Since renegotiations between the concessionaire and the government are bilateral, surpluses are split according to the relative bargaining abilities of each. A better lobbyist should get a larger fraction of the pie in any renegotiation. Hence, if two rms are equally e cient, the rm with a better lobbyist can bid by less at the competitive auction and win the concession, in the expectation that in a later opportunistic renegotiation it can recover from having bid less.
As formalized in Engel et al. (2019b) , in the competition for government contracts, rms that are worse in both aspects-technical e ciency and the ability to renegotiate-do not survive. They cannot compensate lower technical e ciency with the possibility of higher revenue from renegotiation. It follows that the rm with the highest degree of technical e ciency will also employ less skillful renegotiators, since they will not have to renegotiate to compensate for ine ciency. The implication is that if a substantial part of pro ts are made in the renegotiation stage, less e cient rms will have an advantage. Hence by self-selection, e cient rms should be attracted to countries in which there is little renegotiation of the initial contract, while countries that renegotiate more will attract technically less pro cient rms.
The third mechanism at work is moral hazard. As we have seen before, PPPs are appropriate when objective quality standards can be set, measured, and enforced. In that case, the concessionaire can be left to choose the production technology, and the cost-cutting incentives will be equivalent to those under a xed-price contract or a price cap. In practice, however, private rms foster the belief that PPP contracts should be adjusted to secure the nancial equilibrium of the concessionaire, an argument that rms often produce to justify renegotiations (among many examples, this was the case for the bailout of Spanish PPPs mentioned above). This is not an acceptable argument for a renegotiation of the contract. If the rms' bids were prudent, the company should expect to receive the normal return on investment after adjusting for risk, as in all other sectors of the economy. Hence, the conditions of the bid should be preserved, and there should be no renegotiation that results in a higher cost of providing the contracted service quality. Renegotiations are not only unnecessary, but also ine cient, because they weaken the incentives to control and reduce costs, thereby dampening the e ciency gains that PPPs can yield. Renegotiations meant to restore the concessionaire's nancial equilibrium transform a xed-price contract into a cost-plus contract. Even worse, since rms with strong renegotiation skills can extract more from the government, they can a ord to exert even less e ort to control costs. Thus, moral hazard increases the advantage held by good renegotiators even further and worsens the adverse selection problem.
Similarly, when the PPP agency has discretion to renegotiate, it feels less pressure to plan and design projects carefully, because it can renegotiate away its own mistakes. The problem is compounded when the costs of renegotiating can be shifted to future administrations and when the PPP agency is not accountable. Thus, when coupled with inadequate accounting or governance, the expectation of renegotiations generates moral hazard in the PPP agency.
Last, recent evidence from Latin America shows a connection between renegotiations and corruption. countries over a ten year period and nd that the average renegotiation, as a fraction of the initial investment, was 71 percent for projects where bribes were paid, compared with 6 percent for projects were bribes were not paid. The projects they consider include both PPPs and traditional provision, suggesting that the connection between corruption and renegotiations is relevant when providing public infrastructure in general. Campos et al. (2019) also show that rms pay bribes to obtain better deals when the contract is renegotiated, as well as more frequent renegotiations.
Governance and remedies
The common threads behind renegotiations are inadequate rules and governance that foster lowballing in the auction, in the expectation of obtaining rents in bilateral bargaining. The remedies combine proper accounting rules, competitive tendering for additional works, and independent review of renegotiations.
As shown by Engel et al. (2019a) , treating PPPs as regular government expenditure and debt eliminates the incentive to use renegotiations to increase current infrastructure spending and burden future administrations.
The remedy to the problems generated by adverse selection and moral hazard is to eliminate economic rents that are bought about by bilateral renegotiations. On the one hand, this would require the application of the so-called sanctity-of-the-bid principle (Guasch, 2004) , that is, the concessionaire's bid caps the compensation that the concessionaire can obtain for the tendered infrastructure. A possibility is that additions to the original works are auctioned to the lowest bid and the concessionaire cannot participate.
In addition, an independent review of the renegotiation by an expert panel could help to ensure the value of the project for the concessionaire does not change. The box below describes panels of this sort in the UK and Chile. Finally, transparency suggests that all contract modi cations be published in a web page, so that the public is informed about the changes and can question the reasons and amounts. By itself, the publication of the modi cations and their value is politically costly and therefore tends to harden the negotiating position of the Public Authority.
D R UK C
In the UK, the framework for dispute resolution is set up in the HM Treasury "Draft Standardization of PF2 Contracts" of December 2012. The document sets up a tiered structure of procedures that starts with a consultation between the parties for a xed period in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. If this consultation approach fails, the parties can put their case before an expert adjudicator, selected from a panel, or alternatively, to mediation or conciliation. If either party believes the decision is not acceptable, they can apply to an arbitration procedure or eventually, the courts. Akinbode and Vickers (2017) . show how these procedures can escalate and how badly de ned contracts can close out reasonable options of solving the con ict.
In Chile, the 2010 reform to the PPP Law established the Technical Experts Panel (TEP), a permanent, independent board of legal and engineering experts that reviews technical disputes between the contracting authority and the private party (usually an SPV). The TEP hears the parties in public audience and issues a recommendation within 30 days. Even though the recommendations are not binding, in 40% of the cases, the parties have agreed to the recommendation. The remaining cases proceed to mandatory arbitration, where the Panel recommendation is considered in the decision.
Chile reformed its PPP law in 2010 and established a Technical Experts Panel (see the box above for details) that provides an opinion on whether contract renegotiations above a certain threshold are fair. In addition, The reform also made it mandatory to put to tender any additional works agreed in a renegotiation, and excluded the concessionaire or any related party from the contract. Table 5 shows renegotiations, as a fraction of initial investment, for Chilean PPPs, both before and after the reform of the PPP law of 2010. Since the time elapsed since the reform is relatively short, we only consider renegotiations during construction, both for highway PPPs and for all PPPs in the transport sector.
The table shows that renegotiations during construction decreased by more than 90 percent following the reform.
PVR contracts
The standard user fee PPP is a xed term contract that is awarded to the rm that bids the lowest fee, shortest term or lowest subsidy. At the end of the xed term, the infrastructure reverts to the State, which can award a new concession or provide the service either for free or charging user fees.
A xed-term contract allocates most of the demand risk to the concessionaire. This makes sense when the infrastructure is a container terminal, where demand responds to the service standards that are di cult to specify and monitor. But demand forecasts for roads are unreliable and depend mostly on exogenous factors such as macroeconomic activity, and quality of service for a highway is easy to specify and enforce.
Thus, in a xed-term contract the winning bid internalizes exogenous risk by asking for a higher return, i.e., a user fee that generates enough expected income to compensate for demand risk. At the same time, in order to make projects bankable, governments are forced to pledge revenue guarantees. Also, as discussed in the previous section, xed-term contracts tend to be renegotiated in times of severe economic stress. In brief, the de cient risk allocation of xed term contracts is expensive.
In this section we argue that exogenous demand risk and opportunistic renegotiations can be mitigated in PPPs with contractible quality of service and high, exogenous, demand uncertainty if present value-ofrevenue (PVR) contract are used (see Engel et al., 1996 Engel et al., , 2001 . Moreover, the state of the asset (i.e. the project) at the end of the concession must be observable, or the concession becomes in fact a privatization, as no other bidder can compete with an incumbent which is informed. 32 This applies for highways, airports and other types of infrastructure where demand is large and exogenous and service quality easy to contract upon. Under a PVR contract, the regulator sets the discount rate and tari schedule, and rms bid the present value of tari revenue they require to nance, build, operate and maintain the infrastructure. 33 The rm that makes the lowest bid gets the concession, which ends when the present value of user fees collected equals the winning bid. It follows that the term of the concession automatically adjusts to demand shocks, resulting in a substantial reduction of demand risk borne by the concessionaire. Since tari s are the main revenue source for the PPP, the contract attains the e ciency gains associated with PPPs discussed in section 4.
Advantages of PVR contracts
There are several advantages to the PVR contract. First there is a reduction in risk, because demand uctuations and its associated revenue variations are re ected in a larger or shorter contract term. Since revenue is in present value terms, duration does not matter from the point of view of the pro tability of the PPP. 34 In turn, as pointed out by Tirole (1997) , this means that bids are cost based, creating incentives to reduce costs, with reduced or no demand risk, which is appropriate since the rm cannot act upon this risk. This is an e cient assignment of risks, lowering the overall cost of the project. In an estimation of the demand risk in highways that appears in Engel et al. (2001) , the reduction in risk associated to a PVR contract compared to a xed term contract meant a 30 percent reduction in the cost of a highway. 35 Cost reduction is not the only bene t from reducing demand risk borne by the rm in a PVR contract.
Another advantage is that there is no need for tra c demand guarantees to make the project bankable (i.e., so that banks can led to the project). Usually projects require 20-30 percent equity, so the PPP must obtain construction nancing for the remainder, and this is di cult to obtain without a government guarantee of user fee revenues corresponding to 70 percent of the expected value of user fee revenues. PVR contracts do not require these guarantees, which can be costly to the State in case of a severe crisis, which is when they are called.
In addition to their advantages in risk allocation, PVR contracts correct an important de ciency of xed-term PPPs. In general, PPP contracts are designed to be in exible, to limit the risk of creeping expropriation by the government. For this reason, xed term PPP contracts have a hard time incorporating early termination clauses in a way that avoids opportunistic behavior by the government. The reason is that the fair compensation is equal to the revenues that would have accrued, had the concession continued to its end. Because future demand is random, that quantity cannot be calculated with veri able information with which both parties agree. In contrast, in the case of PVR, the government has the option to unilaterally buy back the concession by paying a "fair" price for the contract. This fair price is equal to the di erence between the bid and the present value of toll revenue already collected (with a sum subtracted for savings in maintenance and operational costs). Because the concessionaire's winning bid determines the total amount of present value revenues it requests, the PVR contract is much closer to a complete contract than a xed-term contract and a fair value for the early buy back option can be calculated at any moment with veri able accounting information.
Similarly, a PVR contract allows some exibility in setting user fees. This can be very valuable, for instance to adjust user fees for a metro underground service to better manage the entire public transportation network in a city or in adjusting congestion tolls for an urban highway PPP. In contrast, having exibility to change user fees in a xed term PPP comes at the cost of a large increase in revenue risk for the concessionaire. This is not the case under a PVR contract, as long as changes in user fees do not threaten the possibility of obtaining the winning bid revenue. PVR PPP US 1990 36, 37 The Dulles greenway and the Orange County SR91 are the two main highway PPPs built in the US during the 1990s (see Engel et al., 2011) . They both ran into trouble of di erent sorts, which would have been avoided under PVR. 35 Availability contracts also shield the concessionaire from demand risk because under them the government pays for both capital and operation costs, and they are useful when user fees cannot be charged. In the case of transport infrastructure, however, user fees can fully or partially fund projects, thus avoiding the bureaucratic costs wrought by the government funding machinery. Also, when users are charged, inter modal decisions are e cient and congestion can be managed. Last, when a project is funded with toll revenue, white elephants-i.e., projects whose construction is a net cost to society-are less likely 36 Based on Gi ord et al. (2014) and Engel et al. (2014) . 37 The SR91 project is also analyzed, from a nancial valuation perspective, in Lucas en Montesinos (2019).
Dulles Greenway
The Dulles Greenway is a 14 mile road joining Dulles International Airport with Leesburg, Virginia. Investors put $40 million in cash and secured $310 million in privately placed, taxable debt. Loans were to be repaid with toll revenues. Tendered as a xed term, 42.5 year concession, it was inaugurated in 1995. Demand turned out to be much lower than expected, with actual tra c equal to only one-fourth of projections. When the PPP defaulted in 1996, lenders restructured its debt and investors wrote o part of their equity. In addition, in 2001 the contract term was extended by 20 years, to 2056.
Despite a major forecast demand error, it was clear that even in low demand scenarios the Dulles Greenway would eventually collect enough tolls to pay for capital and operational expenditures. Therefore, had the PPP been tendered using PVR, the contract term would have extended automatically when demand turned out to be lower than expected, thereby avoiding losses for investors and bondholders. The contract renegotiation and debt restructuring that followed, essentially turned the original xed term contract into a PVR contract, yet this happened at a high cost.
Orange County's SR 91
In 1995, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) awarded a 35-year concession for a 10-mile segment of the four-lane Riverside Freeway (also called State Route 91) between the Orange-Riverside county line and the Costa Mesa Freeway (State Route 55) to a private rm, California Private Transportation Corporation (CPTC). Motorists used the express lanes to avoid congestion in the non-tolled lanes, paying up to almost $11 for a round trip.
By the late 1990s, 33,000 daily trips brought the express lanes to the brink of congestion at peak time, turning the concession into a nancial success. At the same time and for the same reasons, users in the non-tolled public lanes were su ering congestion, and an expansion was urgently needed. Nevertheless, the contract included a non-compete clause that prevented Caltrans from increasing capacity at Riverside Freeway without CPTC's consent. Caltrans tried to elude the clause, arguing that expansions were necessary to prevent accidents, but CPTC led a lawsuit. The verdict stated that non-compete clauses were meant to ensure the nancial viability of CPTC and that they restrict Caltrans's right to adversely a ect the project's tra c or revenues. Consequently, no new lanes could be built.
Protracted negotiations ensued, and eventually the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) was empowered to negotiate the purchase of the tolled lanes. The value of the concession was controversial since it should have been the present value of pro ts from the State Route 91 Express Lanes had the franchise continued as originally planned. Although the lanes cost $130 million to build, initially the concession's value was set at $274 million in a controversial (and ultimately unsuccessful) buyout attempt by a non-pro t associated with Orange County. After several years of negotiations, with frustrated commuters stuck in tra c in the meantime, the express lanes were bought in January 2003 by OCTA for $207.5 million. Press reports suggest that CPTC received additional compensation.
Because this was a xed-term PPP, demand risk was borne by the concessionaire. Therefore, this dispute was about the value of lost revenues and was unrelated to the cost of the infrastructure. Moreover, because the term was xed, the value of lost revenues was inherently subjective. Not surprisingly, the concessionaire and OCTA disagreed. The disagreement had real economic cost: it delayed capacity expansion and prolonged costly congestion In contrast, had this been a PVR contract that included a clause allowing government to buy back the concession at any point in time, paying the di erence between the winning bid and the amount collected (with a subtraction for savings in maintenance costs), no protracted renegotiation process would have been necessary.
PVR in practice
United Kingdom 38 The rst present-value-of-revenue PPP contract that we know of was awarded to Trafalgar House on September 29, 1986 , to build the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge, conditional on approval from Parlament. The proposal by Trafalgar was deemed the best among eight proposals for crossing the Thames River at Dartford. Among the proposals were ve bridges and three tunnels.
The contract stipulated that Trafalgar would buy the two existing tunnels for £43 million, build a new 450 meter long bridge and operate all three for a maximum of 20 years or until toll fees paid o the debt and equity, whichever happened rst. The project had four shareholders: Trafalgar House (50%), Kleinwort Benson (16.5%), Prudential (16.5%) and Bank of America (17%). The consortium nanced the bridge with subordinated debt issued by insurance companies, and term loans by banks. Project nance was used and the concessionaire had only nominal equity. Interest on the syndicated loan were oating, at a margin of between 0.75 and 1.25% above prime.
The bridge opened in 1991 and after accruing the necessary toll revenue, the contract terminated in March of 2002, almost ten years before the maximum concession term of 20 years. The SPV in charge of the PPP was liquidated, the bridge reverted to public management and the government began collecting tolls, now referred to as charges.
The Second Severn Crossing PPP on the Severn Estuary, which was tendered in 1990 and opened in 1996, also used a PVR contract. The contract stipulated a term of 30 years or until the concessionaire collected £995.8 million (in July 1989 prices), whichever occurred rst. As with the Queen Elizabeth II bridge, the PPP was nanced fully with debt. Control of the crossing and the original Severn Bridge reverted to the UK government on 8 January 2018, after the required revenue had been collected. At that point responsibility for operating the bridge passed to Highways England, a public entity.
Chile 39 Figure 6 shows the cumulative investment in transport PPPs in Chile since the PPP program was launched in 1993 with the El Melón tunnel. As can be seen in the gure, initially all PPPs were xed term. The rst PVR contract was auctioned in 1998, but after 2006 PVR contracts became the norm. Note that a third type of contract -the so-called revenue distribution mechanism or MDI-appeared in 2002. These were ve xed-term PPPs that were renegotiated and turned into variable-term contracts in 2002, after their revenue plummeted during a recession in the late 1990s. By 2017, 29 of the 66 PPPs awarded were variable-term contracts. As Figure 2 shows, by 2017 the cumulative investment in transport PPPs in Chile exceeded USD 12 billion. 55 percent of all investment had been made with (or turned into) variable-term contracts. 
Financing and renegotiations: theory and evidence
Flexible term contracts have been used in the UK, Chile, Colombia and Portugal. Given all the advantages described above, begs the question of why they have not been used more broadly.
We can think of two reasons. First, there exists a belief that PVR nancing is more di cult (see Klein, 1997 , for an early example). 40 We argue below that this belief is incorrect. Second, PVR makes it harder to renegotiate PPP contracts, which may explain why they have been opposed by concessionaires. 41 We explain next why nancing of a PVR contract compares well with nancing of xed-term contracts. We also explain why PVR contracts make opportunistic renegotiations less likely and present evidence consistent with this explanation.
One reason why structuring PVR contracts may be harder is that the contract term is not known in advance. This would seem to impose additional challenges on xed maturity debt which may make nancing more costly. Another concern is that the risk of debt prepayment by bondholders will be higher under PVR contracts, since the SPV will want to pay its debt and dissolve early when demand turns out to be high.
To address the above concerns, we begin by noting that demand realizations are independent of the type of contract being used. Therefore, if tolls are the same, the per period cash ows generated by a project depend only on demand realizations, and not on the type of PPP contract. It follows that the main di erence between a xed term and a PVR contract is that the latter lasts longer in low demand scenarios, and ends earlier in high demand scenarios. Therefore, when demand turns out to be low, the concessionaire can automatically tap revenues which are unavailable under a xed term contract to repay debt. This implies that the risk borne by debt nanciers will be lower under PVR, and that the PPP can take a higher leverage. At the same time, the fact that the contract ends sooner in high demand scenarios implies a higher prepayment risk under PVR. However, the prepayment option does not come at a signi cant cost to lenders, because it is not triggered by a strategic response of the borrower to the fall in interest rates. On the contrary, prepayment is triggered by an exogenous event -an unexpectedly high demand for the project-. Moreover, because exogenous prepayments occur when demand for the project is high, they are likely to happen when the economy is booming and interest rates are high. By contrast prepayment risk is usually costly for lenders because borrowers strategically make a prepayment when interest rates fall and they can re nance at lower cost. The fact that PVR is not correlated to these scenarios means prepayment risk is low or even inexistent. The Chilean experience with nancing PVR contracts is consistent with the above arguments (see Engel et al., 2019c) .
Summing up, PVR contracts may be viewed as having a built-in renegotiation clause that is triggered by low demand realizations. When demand is lower than expected, the contract length extends automatically and total revenues for the rm, in present value, are una ected. In contrast with xed term PPPs, no costly contract renegotiation is needed. Table 6 compares renegotiations under xed-term and PVR, for highway PPPs in Chile (similar 40 For nancing of PPPs in general, and the important role of project nance, see, for example, Ehlers, Packer and Remolona (2014), Inderst (2010, 2013) 41 The PPP sector lobbied against PVR when it became the standard contract for highway and airport PPPs in Chile in 2007.
results are obtained if airport PPPs are included as well). The table reports renegotiations, as a fraction of the initial investment, both during construction and during the rst eight years of operation. 42 Clearly, renegotiations under PVR have been considerably lower -about one tenth-than under the xed-term contracts. This is consistent with PVR contracts providing less incentives for concessionaires to renegotiate contracts, since low demand realizations have very little impact on their bottom line.
Conclusion
One of the main conclusions of this chapter is that PPPs can be a useful instrument of public policy, even though the main motivation for their use is based on a misconception. The erroneous claim that PPPs free up public funds is popular among policymakers, because they can increase infrastructure spending and circumvent budgetary controls while not increasing the de cit. However, the reason why PPPs can make an important contribution to social welfare is that they can deliver e ciency gains. We described eight potential sources of improvements in productivity under PPPs, prominent among them is cheaper and better maintenance.
It is often argued that PPPs should be preferred over public provision only when the e ciency gains under PPPs are large enough to compensate the higher cost of private debt. 43 We believe this argument is weak, as it ignores the origin of the lower interest paid on public debt: in times of economic stress, governments can resort to options that are not available to private rms, such as increasing taxes or lowering social expenditure to continue paying its nancial obligations (Klein, 1997) . These options entail a social cost that is not re ected in the lower rate of interest paid by public debt. Furthermore, using the government cost of funds as the discount rate, contradicts 42 Considering longer periods of operation reduces signi cantly the number of projects with PVR, since these contracts began being used on a regular basis only in 2007. 43 For example, the January 2019 NAO Report "PFI and PF2" states that "the higher cost of nance, combined with these other costs, means that overall cash spending on PFI and PF2 projects is higher than publicly nanced alternatives. " And "Our analysis of these data for one group of schools shows that PF2 costs are around forty per cent higher than the costs of a project nanced by government borrowing", from page 19 of the Report. the fair value approach which "posits that the cost of capital for any real or nancial investment re ects the market price of the associated risks" (Lucas and Montesinos, 2019).
Another reason why interest rates paid on private debt to nance infrastructure under a PPP are higher than rates under public provision is poor contract design. This is the case, for example, when the concessionaire is forced to bear demand risk beyond its control, as is the case for xed term PPP contracts.
Experience thus far suggests that successful PPPs require careful project and contract design by the government and good governance, both during the procurement and operation stages. However, there is a widespread belief that using PPPs the government can delegate project design and delivery, and transfer all relevant risks to the concessionaire through the PPP contract. The outcome of poor contract design and de cient governance are pervasive renegotiations even in the initial stages of the PPP contract. Renegotiations generate problems, because they substitute bilateral renegotiations for competitive tendering, and thus stimulate lowballing at the tendering stage. Pervasive renegotiations can also be used by political incumbents to bring forward infrastructure spending. They also create adverse selection by attracting rms with a comparative advantage at renegotiating over technical skills, and generate moral hazard by allowing governments and concessionaires to renegotiate away their mistakes in the design of the project. In addition, recent corruption scandals suggest a link between renegotiations and bribing. And because renegotiations tend to delay project completion, they foster cost overruns through accumulation of overheads. This is not to say that all contract renegotiations reduce public welfare, but when renegotiations occur in the rst years of the contract, there is a strong presumption that this is the case.
On the other hand, when SPV equity holders and creditors know that they face a hard budget constraint and the possibility of losses if the project is not well designed, built, maintained and operated, incentives are aligned and it becomes likely that PPPs realize the e ciency gains they promise. In the last 30 years of studying PPPs we have compiled a set of best practices.
First, PPPs would become more credible if their link to the intertemporal scal constraint is acknowledged. This occurs if investment in PPPs is included in public accounts the same way as public investment, since they impact the intertemporal scal constraint similarly. Second, careful planning, project design, and project management help ensure that PPPs ful ll their promise. Careful planning reduces the frequency of costly mistakes and of events that require modications to the contract, and thus the need for renegotiations. In addition, if renegotiations are reviewed and possibly approved by an independent expert panel, the incentives to renegotiate contracts are reduced. Similarly, if any additional works required by the project once it has been awarded is tendered competitively, there are fewer incentives to attempt to change the conditions of the project by these additions. Finally, if concessionaires are not required to bear demand risk which they cannot control, the cost of the project is lower.
In 2010 Chile modi ed its PPP law, introducing an independent panel to review contract rene-gotiations and excluded concessionaires from building additions agreed in renegotiations. In addition, since 2007 Chile has routinely used PVR contracts, a exible term contract that shields the concessionaire from demand risk it cannot control. While we cannot prove causality, these reforms were based on sound economic analysis and were followed by a substantial decrease in renegotiations of more than 90 percent. Which illustrates the more general point we make in this paper, namely that governance and careful contract design are important to reap the bene ts from PPPs.
